Examining the Dynamics of Cooperation Between Competing Firms in Their R&D Activities (R&D Co-Opetition) by Maroofi, F. (Fakhraddin)
EXAMINING THE DYNAMICS 
OF COOPERATION BETWEEN 
COMPETING FIRMS IN THEIR 
R&D ACTIVITIES 
(R&D CO-OPETITION)
Received: May 2015, Revised: August 2015, Accepted: September 2015, Available online: November 2015
The relationship between collaboration with competitors and goods innovation performance was 
investigated along with the moderating effect of the innovating firm’s technological capability. The 
hypothesis that collaboration with competitors has an inverted U-shaped relationship with goods 
innovation performance was tested using data on new goods introductions from 749 Iranian firms. 
The results support the balance between competition and collaboration by confirming that col-
laboration with competitors contributes considerably to successful goods innovation. The positive 
influences of co-optation certainly seem consistent with the cooperative arguments that collabo-
ration with competitors increases absorptive capacity, improves information exchange and facili-
tates joint problem solving. The results also show that unnecessary collaboration with competitors 
can have a negative influence on innovation performance, raising concerns about opportunistic 
exploitation. The results support the existence of a bell-shaped relationship between co-opetition 
and goods innovation performance. Technological capability and alliances with universities were 
shown to weaken the relationship.
Keywords: co-opetition, technological capabilities, R&D collaboration, goods innovation, emerging 
market
Hubungan antara kolaborasi dengan pesaing dan kinerja inovasi barang diinvestigasi bersamaan 
dengan efek moderasi kapabilitas inovasi teknologi perusahaan. Hipotesis bahwa kolaborasi den-
gan pesaing memiliki hubungan berbentuk U terbalik dengan kinerja inovasi barang diuji menggu-
nakan data pada produk baru dari 749 perusahaan Iran. Hasil menunjukkan bahwa keseimbangan 
antara persaingan dan kolaborasi berkontribusi pada kesuksesan inovasi barang. Pengaruh positif 
dari kooptasi terlihat konsisten dengan argumentasi bahwa kolaborasi dengan pesaing mening-
katkan absorptive capacity, meningkatkan pertukaran informasi dan memfasilitasi penyelesaian 
masalah bersama. Hasil juga menunjukkan bahwa kolaborasi yang tidak penting dengan pesaing 
dapat berpengaruh negatif terhadap hubungan berbentuk bel antara koopetisi dan kinerja inovasi 
barang. Kapabilitas teknologi dan aliansi dengan universitas juga mampu melemahkan hubun-
gan tersebut.
Keywords: co-opetition, kapabilitas teknologi, kolaborasi R&D, inovasi barang, pasar berkembang
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researchers have recognized the value 
of the tensions arises, and emphasized 
that firms in such relationships have a 
stimulus to cooperate in the pursuit of 
mutual interests and normal benefits 
while competing in the pursuit of their 
own interests at the price of competi-
tors (Bengtsson, Eriksson and Win-
cent, 2010; Gnyawali and Park, 2009). 
However, there are very few empirical 
studies which reflect the dynamic pro-
cess. Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse (2007) 
have stated that the traditional rivalry 
view is not well suited to understanding 
the complexity of engaging in allied 
activities with competitors. Bengtsson, 
Eriksson and Wincent (2010) suggest-
ed that because of the differences in 
focus between paradigms focusing on 
cooperative and competitive, respec-
tively, it is difficult to achieve such an 
integration within one of these fields. 
Moreover, they stated that as there is 
a lack of knowledge about the effects 
of co-opetition and different types of 
interactions, systematic empirical re-
search that goes beyond our conceptu-
al advancements. The present research 
is studding these weaknesses by ex-
amining the dynamics of collabora-
tion between competing firms in their 
R&D activities. Collaborating with 
competitors ranges from joint research 
and development (R&D) arrange-
ments (Ahuja, 2000), to shared mar-
ket assets or brand names (Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad, 1994), to shared 
manufacturing process (Uzzi, 1997). 
This makes the knowledge base of the 
competitor firm more appropriate, and 
competing partners can improve their 
knowledge and skills and improve 
their absorptive capacity through the 
co-opetition. Meanwhile, the strongest 
motive for opportunistic behavior can 
lead to information leakage, changes 
To survive competitive environ-ment, firms are increasingly oc-cupied in cooperative alliances 
with various partners ranging from 
universities (Wu, 2011), suppliers (Ni-
eto and Santamaría, 2007), custom-
ers (Belderbos, Carree and Lokshin, 
2004), service intermediaries (Pan-
garkar and Wu, 2012) and govern-
ment officials (Wu and Chen, 2012) to 
competitors (Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse, 
2007). Therefore, collaboration with 
competitors (so called “co-opetition”) 
has attracted increasing research inter-
est over the past decade (Bengtsson, 
Eriksson and Wincent, 2010; Gnyawa-
li and Park, 2009, 2011; Ritala, 2012). 
While the impacts of co-opetition of 
innovation and firm performance seem 
quite clear, there are two deficien-
cies in previous research which limit 
our understanding. First, research in 
collaboration with competitors has 
revived our argument about its posi-
tive and negative effects on strategic 
behavior and firm performance. While 
many researchers support that collabo-
ration with competitors, serious about 
the inefficiencies of competition, im-
proves information exchange, reduces 
uncertainty and risks and speeds up 
new goods development (Gnyawali 
and Park, 2011; Ritala and Hurmel-
inna‐Laukkanen, 2012), others high-
light to the downside of the co-ope-
tition such as unplanned knowledge 
leakage, management difficulties, and 
loss of control (Nieto and Santamaría, 
2007; Wu, 2012). But academic stud-
ies have previously tended to treat 
these two influences separately, rather 
than demonstrating both the positive 
and negative sides of the co-opetition 
(Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse, 2007). Due 
to the parallel cooperative and com-
petitive interactions confusion, recent 
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literature illustrates the neoclassical 
and industrial organization theories, 
emphasizes the desirable effects of 
competition for society and firms, and 
suggests that collaboration between 
competitors may breed implicit or ex-
plicit complicity and thus harm cus-
tomers (Podolny and Scott Morton, 
1999). Collaboration with competitors 
is viewed as a market deficiency which 
abstructs competitive dynamics and its 
resulting benefits. Scholars who stud-
ied the cooperative literature, based on 
the network and game theories, have 
argued that collaboration with com-
petitors improves firm performance 
by the negative effects of competition 
and improving information exchange 
(Uzzi, 1996). But competitive influ-
ences on a relationship are usually ig-
nored and the negative influences of 
competition are merely mentioned. In 
fact, the two different interactions must 
co-exist when competitors cooperate 
due to their conflicting interests, and 
at the same time they must cooperate 
due to the interests they have (Das and 
Teng, 2000). The concept of co-ope-
tition has been introduced to describe 
and analyze such phenomena, as a so-
lution for the weaknesses of the con-
ventional paradigms. Scholars have 
conceptualized co-opetition as parallel 
collaboration and competition, which 
transcends the choices and highlights 
the interaction between competition 
and collaboration (Bengtsson, Eriks-
son and Wincent, 2010).
Different Views of Co-opetition
Collaborating with competitors’ dis-
plays two different lines of thinking 
about dynamic co-opetition. First, the 
argument focuses on the environmen-
tal interaction in the co-opetition and 
argues that the competitive and coop-
in the objectives and core technol-
ogy for individual gain (Gnyawali and 
Park, 2009). The relative difficulty of 
achieving a balance in the interactions 
makes R&D co-opetition and useful 
setting for studying the dynamics that 
underlie complex relationships. This 
research is studying the twin effects 
of R&D co-opetition on firm goods in-
novation. Goods innovation refers to a 
firm’s successful introduction of new 
goods, which is a primary way firms 
achieve a position of competitive ad-
vantage (Wu, 2012). However, a firm 
engaged in R&D co-opetitionshould 
be positively related with its good in-
novation performance, but, that any 
positive effect would decline collabo-
ration with competitors. This research 
also explored the limits of effective 
R&D co-opetition arising from firm 
capabilities and external linkages. 
Moreover, the study tested contradic-
tory hypotheses about the moderating 
effects of firm-specific technological 
capability and ties with universities or 
research institutes.  
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Concept of Co-opetition
There are many examples of manu-
facturing and service industries where 
competing firms cooperate in differ-
ent stages of the value chain. R&D 
co-opetition is exemplified by Nokia, 
Sony Ericsson, Samsung and other 
mobile phone firms joining together 
to operate systems in the battle over 
whether mobile phone operators will 
take the lead on integrating the inter-
net with mobile telephone (Bengts-
son, Eriksson, and Wincent, 2010). 
The competition and the collaboration 
paradigm take account of such compli-
cated relationships. The competition 
90
the co-opetition should be looked 
upon as occurring along one or two 
separate continua (Padula and Dagni-
no, 2007). One continuum ranges from 
complete competition to complete col-
laboration. In between is the possibil-
ity of different degrees of co-opetition 
relationship. Relationships display-
ing stronger collaboration will have 
more restricted competitive behavior, 
and vice versa (Bengtsson and Kock, 
2000). But this single continuum ap-
proach does not take interactions con-
fused in any co-opetition relationship. 
The two-continuum approach suggests 
that collaboration and competition are 
two different interactions proceeding 
in parallel within an co-opetition re-
lationship, and the relationship should 
be treated as having two continuums 
rather than just one (Bengtsson, Eriks-
son and Wincent, 2010). Therefore, 
two-continuum approach at different 
levels of collaboration and competi-
tion can co-exist. This two continuum 
approach was the point of this study. 
The interactions of competitive and 
cooperative aspects of co-opetition 
should have important implications 
for partnering firms’ innovation per-
formance.
Hypotheses
Co-opetition and Goods Innovation
Good innovation, which a firms adapt 
and creates a restless environments 
and achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage (Eisenhardt  and Tabrizi, 
1995). Among various factors which 
identified as an innovation success-
ful, absorptive capacity is a central 
one (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Absorptive capacity refers to a firm’s 
ability to recognize knowledge which 
has value, and apply it to commercial 
erative relationships and interdepend-
encies in the environment influence 
the behavior of individuals, groups or 
organizations, determining whether or 
not they engage in co-opetition (Lado, 
Boyd and Hanlon, 1997). Co-opeti-
tionemerges as a contextual charac-
teristic influencing firms’ competitive 
behavior. In this view, two competitors 
can cooperate with each other to bet-
ter compete with a third firm. Research 
adopting this perspective has focused 
on how individual units and organiza-
tions act, or should act, towards their 
environment in an co-opetitionsetting. 
Therefore, they describe the competi-
tive and cooperative parts of the rela-
tionship as divided between the actors; 
that is, a firm with a network can have 
a cooperative relationship with some 
firms in the network and a competitive 
relationship with others. An alterna-
tive argument describes the co-opeti-
tionas a mutual interaction involving 
more entities (Bengtsson, Eriksson 
and Wincent, 2010). In an co-opetition 
relationship, the expected benefits of 
collaboration are predicated on trust, 
and the parallel competition suggests 
that the benefits of the collaboration 
may be constrained by the conflicting 
interests of the two parties. Such inter-
actions are on the intra-organizational 
and inter-organizational levels (Tsai, 
2002), but co-opetition between col-
leagues competing for promotion is 
probably a normal form of all (Hatcher 
and Ross, 1991; Smith and Bell, 1992). 
The process view of the co-opetition 
suggests that the competitive and co-
operative parts of an co-opetition rela-
tionship are separated among activities 
rather than among actors (Bengtsson 
and Kock, 1999). The process view 
can be further classified into two dif-
ferent approaches based on whether 
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cal capability and facilitates informa-
tion exchange; it can also entail joint 
problem-solving arrangements. Such 
joint problem-solving makes nego-
tiation and mutual adjustment routine, 
helping the partners flexibly resolve 
problems and improves organization-
al responses by reducing shortage of 
goods and speeding up goods devel-
opment (Gnyawali and Park, 2009; 
Kang and Kang, 2010). Moreover, 
such arrangements help firms work 
through problems together, receive di-
rect feedback and increase the chance 
of discovering new solutions (Uzzi, 
1997). Collaboration with competitors 
would expect to positively influence a 
firm’s goods innovation performance. 
However, this positive influence may 
decline as collaboration with competi-
tors becomes large. Due to the parallel 
existence of a competitive dimension 
in an co-opetition relationship, part-
nering firms still have strong stimulus 
to compete in the pursuit of their own 
interests at the price of their partner 
(Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). There-
fore, parties should be quite capable of 
understanding each other’s technology 
and knowledge, too much collabora-
tion may  improve  the  competitor’s 
ability to copy a firm’s technology and 
improve its own absorptive capacity 
(Ritala and Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 
2012), making the competitor firm 
even more competitive. In addition, 
unnecessary inter-organizational col-
laboration and trust (especially with a 
firm’s competitors) may put the firm 
at risk and opportune exploitation by 
its alliance partners (Selnes and Sallis, 
2003). In co-opetition there is always 
a high risk of unintended knowledge 
spillover, and this is especially serious 
in R&D co-opetition (Ritala and Hur-
ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Academic researchers have proposed 
technological capability–a firm’s abil-
ity to put new technologies to work–as 
an important component of absorptive 
capacity that plays a critical role in 
successful goods innovation (Wu and 
Wu, 2013b). However, technological 
capability is embedded in organiza-
tional routines, making it firm-specific 
if separated from the creating firm (Di-
erickx and Cool, 1989; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1994). A firm can improve its 
technological capability by cooperat-
ing with competing firms that have 
developed their own technological 
capabilities. In comparison with non-
competing firms, competing firms have 
useful and specific knowledge to pos-
sess similar strategic resources, and to 
be pursuing normal goals (Gnyawali 
and Park, 2009). Improved informa-
tion exchange is another advantage of 
the firm’s cooperating with competi-
tors. As Uzzi (1997) has suggested, in-
formation exchange in embedded ties 
was more proprietary and tacit than 
the price and quantity data. A plenty of 
empirical evidence supports the idea 
that competitors as innovation part-
ners may get benefits from their nor-
mal understanding in terms of greater 
value-creation potential. The benefits 
of information exchange are especially 
great when the partners are competi-
tors, because there is a greater overlap 
of interests among competing firms 
attempting to apply similar resources 
to meet the demands of similar cus-
tomers (Ingram and Roberts, 2000). 
So partnering firms benefit from infor-
mation transfer, based on which each 
can more accurately forecast mar-
ket changes and adapt to them (Uzzi, 
1996, 1997). Collaboration with com-
petitors not only improves technologi-
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help a firm understand and learn from 
a competitor’s technological expert. 
This can be helpful in realizing the 
potential of R&D collaboration with 
competitors. The firms with strong 
technological capabilities can easily 
incorporate knowledge from outside 
sources, and there are chances that 
such knowledge will prove useful in 
creating innovative new goods (Ritala 
and Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2012). 
Moreover, a firm with strong techno-
logical capabilities may be more able 
to select trusting, capable partners to 
help the firm avoid technology leakage 
and opportunistic behavior (Gnyawali 
and Park, 2009). The innovation ben-
efits of cooperating with a competitor 
should therefore improve with a firm’s 
strong technological capability.
H2a: Strong technological capability 
positively moderates any posi-
tive relationship between col-
laboration with competitors and 
good innovation performance. 
Capabilities can be built in-house, and 
through collaboration with universi-
ties and research institutes (Hamel, 
1991). Firms choose between different 
styles of capability based on the trade-
offs involved. Therefore, cooperating 
with competitors is not the only way 
in which a firm acquires and develops 
goods innovation capabilities. It also 
does not change the fact that a firm 
and its competitors still remain com-
petitors in the market, in which the 
firm with the greater absorptive ca-
pacity will tend to be on the winning 
side (Hamel, 1991). This leads to a 
sort of learning race where each firm 
is trying to learn more than it teaches 
(Hamel, 1991). If one party has strong 
technology, then it does not need to 
rely on its competitors to develop 
melinna; Laukkanen, 2012). As Zeng 
and Chen (2003) warn, trusting partner 
can become an easy target for exploita-
tion by its greedy partners. Moreover, 
firms that are overly cooperative with 
their competitors may need to allocate 
actual resources to safeguard their in-
vestments (Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse, 
2007). The actual investment in creat-
ing an appropriate co-opetition frame-
work and monitoring systems may in-
crease the rigidity of the collaboration 
and decrease its innovation efficiency 
(Kang and Kang, 2010; Lhuillery and 
Pfister, 2009). Rindfleisch and Moor-
man (2003) suggest that co-opetitive 
partners devote to monitoring hamper 
their ability to maintain a strong cus-
tomer focus. Therefore weak collabo-
ration with competitors can sacrifice 
some of the potential benefits of work-
ing with competitors and hamper inno-
vation, but unnecessary collaboration 
can also be harmful because of the risk 
of exploitation opportunity. Therefore 
a moderate level collaboration with 
competitors appears to be optimal.
H1: Collaboration with competitors 
has an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship with a partnering firm’s 
goods innovation performance.
The Role of Technological Capability
Firms with strong technological ca-
pabilities are able to generate more 
value from collaboration with com-
petitors, although permission to infor-
mation about a partner’s technology 
and knowledge base should be useful 
(Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse., 2007). Be-
cause such capabilities are important 
components of absorptive capacity–a 
firm’s ability to recognize the value of 
new information, incorporate it and ap-
ply it to commercial ends–they should 
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Zahra and Wood, 2002). Moreover, 
collaboration with a university or re-
search institute can help a firm reduce 
its R&D expenditure. This is useful for 
firms which maintain extensive R&D 
facilities. Collaboration with a uni-
versity or research institute can give 
them permission which they need for 
new goods development and the ex-
pertise of the institution’s personnel 
(George,  Zahra and Wood, 2002). As 
a result, the firm may be able to sup-
port more numerous R&D and new 
product development projects, and of 
course a university or research insti-
tute is much less likely to try to appro-
priate the results of the collaboration. 
As Pangarkar and Wu (2012) stated, 
alliances with universities pose lower 
threats to a partnering firm in terms of 
the appropriation of their skills or cre-
ating future competitors, and success-
fully reduces the high risk  related  to 
alliances with competitors. As the uni-
versity or institute is the source of the 
knowledge and innovation, this gives 
firms and stimulus to collaborate with 
a university or research institute rather 
than a competitor in goods innovation 
wherever possible. The value of col-
laboration with competitors in goods 
innovation declines accordingly.
H3a: Research collaboration with uni-
versities and research institutes 
negatively moderates any posi-
tive relationship between col-
laboration with competitors and 
good innovation performance.
According to Jiang, Tao and San-
toro, (2010), also Pangarkar and Wu, 
(2012), research collaboration with 
universities and research institutes 
may bring a firm a non-redundant in-
flow of resources. Pangarkar and Wu 
(2012) showed that alliances with uni-
new goods (Ahuja, 2000), and at the 
same time it is interested in revealing 
its core technologies to the other party 
(Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000). 
This is serious when the two parties 
are direct competitors. A learning race 
stimulates each party with appropriate 
knowledge contributed by the others, 
but a manager interviewed by Hamel 
(1991) explained that, whatever they 
learn from us, they will use against us 
worldwide. Hence firms with strong 
technological capability may have 
fewer stimuli to cooperate with com-
petitors in developing new goods. The 
disposition to reject new ideas from 
outsiders will weaken a firm’s ability 
to gain innovation benefits from col-
laboration with competitors.
H2b: Strong technological capability 
negatively moderates any posi-
tive relationship between col-
laboration with competitors and 
good innovation performance.
The Role of Research Collaboration
A firm’s innovation benefits of col-
laboration with its competitors mostly 
depend on external linkages. Col-
laboration with competitors is less 
important for firms which already 
collaborate with universities or re-
search institutes. Collaboration with 
a university or research institute gives 
a firm permission to scientific knowl-
edge and complementary assets for its 
good innovation with much less risk 
of educating its competitors (Belder-
bos, Carree and Lokshin, 2004; Tether, 
2002). Links with universities can also 
offer an opportunity to enter into less 
direct alliances with other firms while 
still gaining exposure to their diverse 
management, marketing, manage-
rial, and innovation systems (George, 
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innovation in 2012 were gathered 
from archival sources and compared 
with the information from the sampled 
firms. The data were therefore taken 
as correctly describing each firm’s 
R&D collaboration with its competi-
tors, and this information was used to 
test the proposed relationships. Prior 
to the questionnaire design, a pilot 
test was designed as semi-structured 
through 34 random exploratory in-
terviews conducted with executive’s 
business managers.  The completed 
questionnaires were sent to a research 
team that went through every question 
to determine whether these manag-
ers had understood the questions cor-
rectly. Based on their feedback, some 
final processing of the questionnaire 
was made to improve the accuracy of 
the questions. A letter of introduction 
was hand delivered to top executives 
(the CEOs or general managers) of 
each company, explaining the purpose 
of the study and inviting participation 
and guaranteeing confidentiality of the 
information provided. These top exec-
utives were contacted by a telephone 
call within four weeks. They were 
reminded of the survey and invited 
to participate in the study. To mini-
mize problems about normal method 
bias, the survey was designed as two 
separate questionnaires that were an-
swered by two different groups of re-
spondents from the same company. 
Accountants or personnel managers 
were asked to complete the first part. 
They provided basic profile informa-
tion such as firm age, external ties, and 
labor force size. The general manager 
was asked to complete the second part. 
They provided the information on in-
novation outcomes and other matters. 
The study employed information on 
the dependent and independent vari-
versities can benefit a firm in several 
different ways, including legitimacy, 
source of knowledge in the basic sci-
ences, and links with local businesses 
which might open up possibilities for 
further collaboration. Similarly, Jiang, 
Tao and Santoro, (2010) stated that 
partnering with organizations outside 
the industry can improve value chain 
coordination. Stuart (2000) suggests 
that firms innovate more and grow 
faster when their alliance partner is 
larger. Based on that logic, collabo-
ration with universities and research 
institutes may generate beneficial syn-
ergies which could strengthen the link-
age between an co-opetition and inno-
vation performance.
H3b: Research collaboration with uni-
versities and research institutes 
positively moderates any posi-
tive relationship between col-
laboration with competitors and 
good innovation performance.
RESEARCH METHOD
Data and Sampling
The empirical analyses employed 
data of this study were gathered via a 
mailed survey. The survey covered a 
wide range of industries including five 
manufacturing sectors (i.e. electronic 
equipments, electronic components, 
consumer goods, vehicles and vehi-
cle parts, apparels, and leather goods), 
five service sectors (i.e. accounting, 
advertising and marketing, business 
logistics,  communications, and infor-
mation technology), and Iranian firms 
with more than 8 employees. These 
firms were randomly selected from 
five provinces (Azerbaijan, Kerman-
shah, Qazvin, Elam, and Hamadan). 
The information regarding firm age, 
number of employees, sales and goods 
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eroscedasticity in the data. In addition, 
we created “dummy” variables repre-
senting industries and cities to model 
coefficient variation, as this statistical 
technique is suggested to effectively 
reduce the concern about possible het-
eroscedasticity related with pooling of 
the data (Greene, 1993).
Measures
Goods Innovation
We measured a firm’s goods innova-
tion by the number of new goods.  Pri-
or studies have shown that the number 
of new goods successfully introduced 
to the market is an important indica-
tor of goods innovation (Katila, 2002). 
Chaney and Devinney (1992) showed 
that the introduction of new goods in-
creases market share and market value, 
and Roberts (1999) found that success-
ful new goods introductions increased 
a firm’s performance. Banbury and 
Mitchell (1995) also suggested that a 
firm that successfully introduced new 
goods increased its survival chances.
Dynamic Co-opetition
Quantifying co-opetition requires in-
formation about whether a firm engag-
es in parallel competition and collabo-
ration in an alliance, and the length of 
collaboration in the alliance.  Among 
the competitors identified, they were 
asked to indicate whether their firm co-
operated with any of them in R&D. A 
ables provided by two different re-
spondents from each firm answering 
at different times. This decreased the 
risk of normal method bias. After de-
leting incomplete questionnaires, the 
final sample comprised of 749 firms 
(including accounting and related ser-
vices sectors, advertising and market-
ing, apparel and leather goods, busi-
ness logistics services, communication 
services, consumer goods, electronic 
components, electronic equipment, 
information technology services, ve-
hicle and vehicle parts industries). Of 
the 749 firms, 41 % were of medium 
size with employees between 50 and 
250 people and 48.09% were smaller 
with less than 50 employees. About 
42% had been in business between 
5 and 10 years, with another 25.50% 
aged between 10 and 30 years, 15.59% 
were older and 17.68% were aged less 
than 5 years. This study used several 
statistical techniques to evaluate het-
eroscedasticity (whether or not pool-
ing data across industries and cities 
was appropriate). First, we followed 
Bowen and Wiersema’s (1999) ap-
proach to analyze the panel data using 
White’s generalized test. The result of 
Breusch–Pagan test statistics revealed 
no heteroscedasticity concerns (χ2 = 
14.99, p = 0.33). Second, we followed 
Wooldridge’s (2009) acclaim to plot 
the estimated residuals against the 
independent variables. There was no 
evidence of systematic patterns of het-
Table 1. Key Success Factors in HADR Missions: Summary of Literature Review
Correlation matrix
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
New goods 1.00 4.05 1.00
Co-opetition 0.03 0.05 0.23* 1.00 
Technological capability 0.23 0.42 0.03* 0.03 1.00 
Research collaboration 0.42 1.25 0.15* 0.42* 0.14* 1.00
Firm age 15.55 15.05 0.04 −0.03 0.03 0.06* 1.00 
Firm size 0.15 0.35 0.07* 0.06* 0.24* 0.22* 0.23* 1.00
* indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.05 level of confidence.
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2002). Previous studies about strong 
technological capability (Wu and Wu, 
2013a) have used R&D intensity as a 
measure of a firm’s technological ca-
pability, and this study followed that 
lead by using the ratio of R&D spend-
ing to total sales, designated Vj. For 
each firm (j), a dummy variable TKj 
was created which took the value 1 if 
Vj exceeded the average for the firm’s 
city and industry and 0 otherwise. In 
prior studies about research collabora-
tion (George, Zahra and Wood, 2002; 
Wu, 2011), research collaboration was 
quantified using the information pro-
vided by the respondents about wheth-
er or not their firms had a contractual 
or informal R&D relationship with a 
university and/or a research institute. 
A dichotomous variable was coded 1 
if a firm reported R&D collaborating 
with a university or research institute 
during the period and 0 otherwise. 
As large firms have more resources to 
allocate goods innovation (Eisenhardt 
and Tabrizi, 1995), the study controlled 
for firm size using the logarithm of the 
number of employees. Prior studies 
have provided about the effect of firm 
age on innovation performance (So-
rensen and Stuart, 2000), so the loga-
rithm of firm age was included in the 
analyses. In addition, because the sam-
ple included firms from ten industries, 
nine industries dummy variables were 
created using the accounting service 
industry as the base group. Four city 
dummy variables were also included 
to control for location effects with 
Qazvin province as the base group in 
the analysis.
Statistical Modelling
The dependent variable (number of 
new goods) ranges from zero to a 
dummy variable co-opetition was then 
coded 1, or 0 otherwise. Extensive 
studies have suggested that a firm’s 
disposition to develop its new goods 
through collaboration with competi-
tors is determined by the competitive 
intensity (Ritala, 2012; Wu, 2012). 
The length of collaboration a firm al-
locates to in an co-opetition relation-
ship was therefore measured as:
P(y=1I×) = G(α+β1 competitive
  +β2 experience
  + ) 1)
Here y is a dichotomous variable re-
flecting a firm’s disposition in devel-
oping new goods (1 = co-development 
with competitors; 0 = in-house devel-
opment); competitive represents the 
intensity of the competition a firm en-
counters which was measured by the 
ratio of increased new competitors 
among all the competitors the focal 
firm encountered (Wu, 2012); experi-
ence represents a firm’s co-opetition 
experience, which was measured by 
the number of years that a firm formed 
an R&D cooperative relationship with 
competitors in the past (Ahuja, 2000); 
and industry is an industry dummy. G 
is a logistic function:
G(Z)=exp(z)/[1+exp(z)]=Δ(z) 2)
Which takes on values between zero 
and one for all real z. This is the cu-
mulative distribution function for 
a standard logistic random variable 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Equation (1) re-
flects the length to which the firm co-
operates with its competitors in R&D 
activities, after controlling industry 
heterogeneity. A high value indicates 
that a firm is likely to cooperate with 
its competitors, whereas a low value 
indicates that is unlikely (Oczkowski, 
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Table 2. Regression Analysis for Successful New Product Introductions
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Constant −0.12
(0.33) 
−0.4
(0.33)
−0.63
 (0.32)
−0.72* 
(0.34)
−0.72* 
(0.34)
−0.72* 
(0.34)
−0.75* 
(0.35)
Firm age 0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Firm size 0.96***
(0.26)
0.621*
(0.28)
0.63*
(0.31)
0.34
(0.27)
0.34
(0.26)
0.34
(0.27)
0.33
(0.26)
Advertising and 
marketing
−0.06
(0.48)
−0.12
(0.48)
−0.23
(0.46)
−0.37
(0.45)
−0.52
(0.45)
−0.38
(0.45)
−0.47
(0.45)
Apparel and 
leather goods
−0.28
(0.48)
−0.23
(0.53)
−0.19
(0.53)
−0.22
(0.52)
−0.18
(0.53)
−0.18
(0.54)
−0.19
(0.52)
Communication 
services
−0.34
(0.47)
−0.75
(0.38)
−0.79*
(0.38)
−0.73
(0.41)
−0.84*
(0.41)
−0.78
(0.42)
−0.86
(0.41)
Consumer 
goods
−0.24
(0.41)
−0.48
(0.38)
−0.46
(0.37)
−0.52
(0.37)
−0.52
(0.36)
−0.51
(0.37)
−0.51
(0.39)
Electronic 
components
−0.37
(0.41)
−0.37
(0.42)
−0.37
(0.41)
−0.48
(0.43)
−0.45
(0.42)
−0.49
(0.42)
−0.44
(0.40)
Electronic 
equipment
−0.35
(0.37)
−0.43
(0.38)
−0.52
(0.37)
−0.58
(0.37)
−0.66
(0.36)
−0.58
(0.37)
−0.65
(0.38)
Information 
technology 
services
0.06
(0.38)
−0.03
(0.42)
−0.11
(0.42)
−0.17
(0.43)
−0.22
(0.43)
−0.17
(0.43)
−0.22
(0.43)
Vehicles and 
vehicle parts
−0.58
(0.37)
−0.687
(0.37)
−0.56
(0.36)
−0.76
(0.38)
−0.77*
(0.37)
−0.75
(0.38)
−0.76*
(0.39)
Qazvin 0.07
(0.25)
−0.08
(0.25)
−0.12
(0.25)
−0.02
(0.25)
−0.06
(0.25)
0.02
(0.25)
−0.04
(0.25)
West Azerbaijan −0.01
(0.24)
0.06
(0.24)
0.11
(0.25)
0.18
(0.24)
0.18
(0.24)
0.22
(0.24)
0.23
(0.24)
East Azerbaijan −0.03
(0.28)
−0.05
(0.29)
−0.00
(0.29)
−0.15
(0.29)
−0.14
(0.29)
0.16
(0.29)
0.16
(0.29)
kurdistan −0.19
(0.33)
−0.22
(0.34)
−0.12
(0.34)
0.04
(0.35)
0.03
(0.35)
0.03
(0.35)
0.02
(0.35)
Co-opetition 12.23***
(2.08)
25.86***
(4.57)
25.83***
(4.55)
28.09***
(4.78)
24.34***
(4.54)
27.95***
(4.99)
Co-opetition2 −59.62***
(12.35)
−51.67***
(12.57)
−77.18***
(14.74)
−43.89***
(12.14)
−68.95***
(13.96)
Technological 
capability
0.36*
(0.18)
0.34*
(0.18)
0.35*
(0.18)
0.35*
(0.18)
Research 
collaboration
0.18**
(0.06)
0.19**
(0.06)
0.23**
(0.08)
0.18**
(0.08)
Co-opetition×
Technological 
capability
−21.85***
(4.68)
−23.48***
(4.53)
Co-opetition×
Research 
collaboration
−0.77*
(0.36)
−0.84*
(0.36)
Log-likelihood −1674.15 −1656.98 −1626.12 −1646.49 −1641.62 −16234.52 −1618.39
AIC 3345.36 3367.89 3345.39 3327.98 3294.89 3288.06 3267.89
BIC 3479.93 3432.78 3422.60 3421.82 3414.64 3410.22 3405.23
d.f. 15 16 17 21 22 22 23
χ2 31.96 65.17 105.93 105.69 120.99 112.79 114.31
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. N = 749. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses
M 1 includes the controls, M 2 adds the main effect of co-opetition, and M3 includes its squared term. M 4 
include the effects of technological capability and collaboration with universities or research institutes (research 
collaboration), 5 includes the interaction of co-opetition with technological capability, M 6 includes the 
interaction term of co-opetition with research collaboration, and finally M 7 is the full model including all the 
variables.
* significance at the p ≤ 0.05 (**p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001) level of confidence (one-tailed tests for hypothesized 
variables, two-tailed tests for controls).
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and Black, 1998). Table 2 provides the 
estimation results testing the hypoth-
eses (M1 includes the controls, M2 
the main effect of co-opetition, M4 re-
search collaboration). To reduce mul-
ticollinearity problems, the moderator 
variables were mean-centered before 
creating the interaction terms (Aiken 
and West, 1991). Chi-squares for these 
models indicate significant explanato-
ry power and the smaller values of the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) in models 2–7 compared with 
each previous model suggest that the 
relative goodness of fit in each model 
improved significantly compared to 
the previous ones. 
Hypothesis 1 deals with the relation-
ship between co-opetition and good 
innovation performance. The coeffi-
cients of co-opetition in M3 (includes 
its squared term) and M7 (the full 
model, including all the variables) is 
positive and significant (β = 26.87, p ≤ 
0.001 in M3; β = 27. 95, p ≤ 0.001 in 
M7), and the coefficients of (co-opeti-
tion) 2 are negative and significant (β 
= −59.62, p ≤ 0.001 in M3; β = −68. 
95, p ≤ 0.001 in M7). Therefore, these 
results support Hypothesis 1; and 
there is an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between co-opetition and good 
innovation performance. Hypotheses 
2a and 2b evaluate the moderating ef-
fect of firm’s technological capabil-
ity. As M5 (includes the interaction of 
co-opetition with technological capa-
bility) and M7 show, the coefficients 
of the interaction of co-opetitionwith 
technological capability are nega-
tive and significant (β = −21. 85, p ≤ 
0.001 in M5; β = −23. 82, p ≤ 0.001 
in M7), indicating that strong techno-
logical capability weakens the positive 
positive value. Such a non-negative 
dependent variable violates the as-
sumptions underlying linear regres-
sion techniques. Therefore negative 
binomial or Poisson regression mod-
els are adopted to deal with such vari-
ables. The large variance in the num-
ber of new goods that the firms have 
introduced makes a negative binomial 
regression model (NBRM) preferable 
to a Poisson regression model (PRM), 
which requires that the mean to be 
equal to the standard deviation (Haus-
man, Hall and Griliches, 1984). How-
ever, a NBRM assumes that all zero 
counts, as well as positive counts, are 
generated by the same negative bino-
mial process. This assumption would 
be unrealistic, because some zero 
counts may be a function of the firms’ 
characteristics and not governed by the 
same process at all. We thereby em-
ployed zero-inflated negative binomial 
(ZINB) regression models in the data 
analysis. We used the number of new 
goods the firm introduced in the prior 
year to estimate the zero counts, tak-
ing into consideration a possible delay 
before the effects of co-opetition, tech-
nological capability, and research col-
laboration would be reflected in goods 
innovation performance.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 reports the descriptive statis-
tics for the variables used in the analy-
ses. A study of the correlations among 
the independent variables suggests 
that multicollinearity was not a major 
concern. This is confirmed by the anal-
ysis of variance of inflation (VIF). The 
VIF values ranged from 1.32 to 3.03, 
well below the cutoff threshold of 
nine, which indicates that there were 
no serious multicollinearity problems 
in the models (Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
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as a local competitor in domestic mar-
kets. They are therefore less likely to 
benefit from cooperating with small 
local players struggled with weak 
technological capability. Small local 
players with weak technology find it 
difficult to partner with technologi-
cally stronger firms because they have 
little to offer. 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that the posi-
tive relationship between co-opetition 
and good innovation performance is 
negatively moderated with a univer-
sity or research institute collaboration, 
whereas hypothesis 3b predicts a posi-
tive moderation. The coefficients of 
the interaction term for co-opetition 
and research collaboration are nega-
tive and significant in M6 (includes 
the interaction term of co-opetition 
with research collaboration) and M7 
(β = −0. 77, p ≤ 0. 05 in M6;  β = −0. 
84, p ≤ 0. 05 in M7), showing that 
collaboration with a university or re-
search institute weakens the positive 
relationship between co-opetition and 
good innovation. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between co-opetition and 
good innovation performance.
Figure 1 shows the interpretation ef-
fect by using a method from Aiken and 
West (1991) for the interaction model. 
In Figure 1 the horizontal axis repre-
sents the length of collaboration a firm 
allocates in its co-opetition with com-
petitors in R&D and the vertical axis 
represents the number of new goods 
successfully introduced. The firms 
were broken into two groups: low 
(where the technological capability 
takes the value of 0) and high (where 
it takes the value of 1). This figure 
shows that the degree of collaboration 
with competitors has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with the number 
of new goods successfully introduced. 
Strong technological capability elimi-
nates the inverted U-shaped effect of 
collaboration with competitors on 
the number of new goods introduced. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2a was rejected 
and hypothesis 2b was supported. This 
could reflect the fact that Iranian firms 
with strong technology have emerged 
Figure 1. The Impacts of Co-opetition and Technological Capability on Goods 
Innovation
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sample of 432 firms. The results did 
not change. Another concern could 
be that while this study used the co-
opetition as a predictor variable, all 
the firms did not have the same chance 
of cooperating with their competitors. 
Firms which reported collaboration 
may be systematically different from 
those reporting. To reduce this con-
cern, a method was employed to cor-
rect this endogeneity problem (Hamil-
ton and Nickerson, 2003). The analysis 
proceeded in two stages. In the first 
stage, probit regression was used to es-
timate the firm engagement in the co-
opetition as a function of firm age, and 
the firm’s innovation performance in 
the previous year. The predicted value 
derived from the first stage was trans-
formed into an inverse Mills ratio2 (λ), 
which was then included as a regressor 
in the second stage model to estimate 
the new best innovation (Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003). The results gener-
ated from this two-stage procedure 
remained consistent with the earlier 
findings. In addition, manufacturing 
and service industries may exhibit dif-
interpretation effect following the 
procedure discussed above. The firms 
were again broken into two groups, 
those without such alliances (where 
research collaboration takes the value 
of 0) and those with alliances (where 
research collaboration takes the value 
of 1). This figure again shows that the 
degree of collaboration with competi-
tors has an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship with the number of new goods. 
The inverted U-shaped relationship 
between collaboration with competi-
tors and the number of new goods in-
troduced is stronger for firms without 
an alliance with a university than for 
those with alliances. These results sup-
port hypothesis 3a, whereas hypothe-
sis 3b was rejected. This could be ex-
plained by the imperfect status of the 
firm–university collaborations in Iran. 
To reduce any concerns that the sam-
ple contained observations without 
any new goods, a limited sub-sample 
constructed was to firms reporting at 
least one new goods, and the models 
were then re-estimated with that sub-
Figure 2. The Impacts of co-opetition and Research Collaboration on Goods 
Innovation
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the limited evidence documented the 
twin effects of co-opetition on innova-
tion outcomes. The results provide a 
shad on the balance between compe-
tition and collaboration by confirm-
ing that collaboration with competi-
tors contributes to successful goods 
innovation, but also showing its dark 
side. The positive influences of co-
opetition are consistent with the coop-
erative arguments, that collaboration 
with competitors increases absorp-
tive capacity, improves information 
exchange, and facilitates joint prob-
lem solving. However the results also 
show that unnecessary collaboration 
with competitors can have a negative 
influence on innovation performance, 
supporting opportunistic exploitation. 
The positive and negative influences 
of co-opetition highlight the need to 
balance competition and collaboration 
to optimize innovation returns. This 
study theoretically explained and em-
pirically demonstrated the moderating 
effect of firm-specific technological 
capability on the relationship between 
collaboration with competitors and in-
novation performance. This study test-
ed the contradictory hypotheses about 
the moderating effects of firm specific 
technological capability and alliances 
with universities, which have previ-
ously been less explored. The positive 
effect co-opetition has on goods in-
novation is negatively moderated by 
strong technological capability and 
alliances with universities. This find-
ing advances the context-dependent 
view of co-opetition. This study com-
plements such findings by emphasiz-
ing the substantive effects of different 
external linkages in firm goods inno-
vation. This study acknowledged that 
firms are embedded in complex, mul-
tiple social ties, and the results confirm 
ferent innovation patterns (Sirilli and 
Evangelista, 1998), so an additional 
robustness test was conducted to ex-
plicitly take this into consideration. 
The sample was divided into manufac-
turing and service sub-samples and all 
the models were re-estimated for each 
subgroup. There was again no signifi-
cant difference in terms of the main ef-
fect of co-opetition and its interaction 
with technological capability and re-
search collaboration, providing further 
evidence of their robustness.
CONCLUSION
This study hypothesized and empiri-
cally showed that collaboration with 
competitors has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with successful goods in-
novation. Strong technological capa-
bility and collaboration with univer-
sities or research institutes negatively 
moderates the relationship between 
co-opetition and goods innovation 
success. These results have several 
important implications. The tension 
has previously been assumed, but the 
resulting dynamics have important im-
plications for South East Asian firms 
regarding firm innovation and perfor-
mance, which have not been validated 
before. This study has filled in some of 
the gaps and more clearly related the 
dynamics of co-opetition to innovation 
performance. The inverted U-shaped 
relationship demonstrated in this study 
gives new concreteness to the role of 
the tensions in influencing firm perfor-
mance. 
This study has addressed two weak-
nesses in the previous research on 
co-opetition. First, the tensions aris-
ing from parallel collaboration and 
competition have implications for firm 
innovation and performance. Second, 
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strong technological capability along 
with other forms of external linkages 
between the South East Asian firms 
and reduce their dependence on others 
and increase their bargaining power in 
alliances with competitors. Instead of 
firm-to-firm competition, collabora-
tion between a pair or small group of 
competitors may promote group com-
petition, which may be an even more 
intense form of rivalry. 
Like all research, this study has some 
limitations that research using a lon-
gitudinal design is needed to confirm 
the relationships proposed in this re-
search. Then, findings such as these 
from a single country can be gener-
alized only with great caution. The 
tests performed in this study need to 
be replicated using data from firms in 
other countries (e.g. South East Asian 
countries) to obtain greater general-
izability. But the results of this study 
lead to several exciting questions for 
future research. The results are based 
on analysis of a horizontal network 
ties among competitors.  It would be 
interesting to examine vertical ties 
with customers and/or suppliers to see 
how firm-specific technological capa-
bility, marketing capability or opera-
tions capability affect the importance 
of such ties. Furthermore, further re-
search could examine other aspects of 
innovation performance, at the South-
East Asian firms, such as process in-
novation.
that it is important to examine how 
different social ties interact to predict 
performance differences. When trad-
ing off the risks and benefits of vari-
ous types of social ties, firms can use 
one type of social tie to substitute for 
another.
The findings of this study suggest that 
managers need to pay more attention 
to how collaboration with competitors 
can contribute to the success of their 
firms’ goods innovation. Managers 
thus should realize that collaboration 
with competitors cannot be unimpor-
tant as a moderator in the mechanisms 
governing business exchanges. They 
should also revise their logic of com-
petition accordingly by incorporating 
the logic of collaboration. Managers 
are encouraged to consider the po-
tential benefits of not only competing 
with their competitors but also build-
ing alliances with them. However, in 
South East Asian firms, collaboration 
with competitors needs to be carefully 
considered because an over-reliance 
on collaboration in R&D may be just 
as harmful as endorsing that strategy. 
Unnecessary collaboration may lead 
to opportunistic exploitation, and in-
creased rigidity and inefficiency in 
the innovation process. Therefore, it 
is critical for a firm to what might be 
termed an co-opetition capability - a 
balance between collaboration and 
competition. The results also show 
that firms should still aim to develop 
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